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I. INTRODUCTION
Trade agreements like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (“TTIP”), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TTP”), or the
Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (“CETA”), have been
heralded as 21st century trade agreements. Besides traditional aims like
lowering trade barriers, the agreements also cover issues ranging from
e-commerce, intellectual property rights, public procurement, to
service liberalization and new forms of regulatory cooperation within
areas like food safety and, labour protection, etc. 1 The ambition and
∗
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1. On the importance of agreements between ‘big powers’ for setting global standards, see
generally DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL
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breadth behind these new trade agreements have not been overlooked
but have been met with great resistance by parts of civil society and
politicians. CETA had nearly been brought down towards the end of its
negotiating process, 2 TTP might be all but dead, and TTIP’s status is
equally uncertain. Although the criticisms against the different trade
agreements take on a wide range of issues, 3 it is the investor-state
dispute settlement system (“ISDS”) that has probably seen the fiercest
resistance, both at the societal level and within the international legal
discourse. 4
The criticisms brought against the investment regime—which
refers to both international investment law and ISDS 5—are diverse, yet
they often share the common undertone of the investment regime being
“the enemy of the state.” 6 As Gus van Harten wrote, the investment
regime has gained in notoriety in recent times as more “investors have
brought aggressive claims against governments in matters of general
public policy, as arbitrators have adopted expansive readings of their
REGULATION (2007); Alberto Alemanno, The Regulatory Cooperation Chapter of the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Institutional Structures and Democratic
Consequences, 18 J. INT'L ECON. L. 625 (2015); Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The
Future of International Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning Process toward a Global
Policy Laboratory, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 103 (2015).
2. Jennifer Rankin, Belgian Politicians Drop Opposition to EU-Canada Trade Deal, THE
GUARDIAN, (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/27/belgiumreaches-deal-with-wallonia-over-eu-canada-trade-agreement [https://perma.cc/7ZTN-R32K].
3. See, e.g., Chris Johnston, Berlin Anti-TTIP Trade Deal Protest Attracts Hundreds of
Thousands,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
10,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/10/berlin-anti-ttip-trade-deal-rally-hundredsthousands-protesters [https://perma.cc/N86B-WNY6]; Janosch Delcker & Cynthia Kroet, More
Than 150.000 Protest against EU-US Trade Deal, POLITICO, (Oct. 10, 2015),
https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-mobilizes-against-eu-u-s-trade-deal-merkel-ttip-ceta/
[https://perma.cc/6T2A-Y59P].
4 . See, e.g., Claire Provost & Matt Kennard, The Obscure Legal System That Lets
Corporations
Sue
Countries,
THE
GUARDIAN,
(Jun.
10,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corportationssue-states-ttip-icsid [https://perma.cc/L2N2-VRH2]. For a more specific legal critique, see
DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, RESISTING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION CRITICAL THEORY AND
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1-17 (2013).
5. On the notion of investment regime, see Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global
Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427, 428-29 (2010).
6. José Alvarez & Gustavo Topalian, The Paradoxical Argentina Cases, 6 WORLD ARB.
& MEDIATION REV. 491, 492 (2012). See Public Statement on the International Investment
Regime, OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL (Aug. 31, 2010) (available at
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement-international-investment-regime-31-august2010/) [https://perma.cc/6PDG-VBET].
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own jurisdiction and of substantive standards under the treaties, and as
some very large awards have been issued against states.” 7 The veracity
of some of the criticisms has been called into question, because with
the argument that the available evidence shows a different picture to
that maintained by the critics. For instance, it is sustained that, contrary
to the claim that the investment regime considerably restricts the policy
space of states, it actually “leaves states the necessary leeway to
implement their policy choices and to legislate in a self-determined and
sovereign manner.” 8
What unites both the critics and the supporters of the investment
regime is a firm belief in the importance of the regime’s legitimacy.
Both sides frequently utilize the vocabulary of legitimacy in the debate,
touching ideas like legitimacy gap, legitimacy crisis, etc. 9 Also, those
contesting the critics acknowledge the relevance of legitimacy. For
example, José Alvarez argues that following certain suggestions by the
critics would harm the legitimacy of the investment regime,
undermining it as a result. 10 Hence, it comes as no surprise to see the
association of legitimacy with the “success” and “longevity” of the
investment regime in the literature. 11
7. Gus Van Harten, Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion, 2
TRADE L. & DEV. 19, 24 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
8. Charles N. Brower & Stephen W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boom to the
Legitimacy of International Investment Law, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 497-98 (2008).
9. See, e.g., David Schneiderman, Legitimacy and Reflexivity in International Investment
Arbitration: A New Self-Restraint?, 2 J. INT'L DISP. SETTLEMENT 471 (2011); Charles H. Brower
II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37
(2003); Ari Afilalo, Towards a Common Law of International Investment: How NAFTA Chapter
11 Panels Should Solve Their Legitimacy Crisis, 17 GEO. INT'L ENVT'L L. REV. 51, 53 (2004);
Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1523-24 (2005);
Frank J. Garcia et al., Reforming the International Investment Regime: Lessons from
International Trade Law, 18 J. INT'L ECON. L. 861 (2015); Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, A
Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in APPEALS
MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 39 (Karl P. Suvant & Michael
Cheswick-Patterson eds., 2008).
10. Alvarez & Topalian, supra note 6, at 536-37. See also Charles N. Brower & Sadie
Blanchard, What’s in a Meme-the Truth About Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and
Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 759 (2013); David D.
Caron & Esme Shirlow, Dissecting Backlash: The Unarticulated Causes of Backlash and Its
Unintended Consequences, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A MIXED
BLESSING? 160 (Geir Ulfstein & Andreas Follesdal eds., 2018).
11. Charles N. Brower et al., The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication System, 19
ARB. INT'L 415, 440 (2003); Barnali Choudhury, International Investment Law as a Global
Public Good, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 481, 498 (2013).
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The legitimacy-talk is of course far from exclusive to the
investment regime. Legitimacy has become central to international
law. 12 Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a skyrocketing
interest in the concept. 13 There is no field in which legitimacy does not
appear: international conflict and security law, international criminal
law, international economic law, international environmental law, and
so forth. Although various explanations can be given about this
extraordinary interest in legitimacy, 14 it is no coincidence that the spike
in attention to the question of legitimacy falls into a time of important
institutional and normative transformations taking place within the
international legal order and beyond. 15 From a consensual normative
order centered on interstate relations, international law has evolved into
a complex and dense normative framework encompassing subject areas
12. See, inter alia, Dencho Georgiev, Letter, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 554 (1989); THOMAS M.
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); Daniel Bodansky, The
Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental
Law?, 93 AM. J. INT' L. 596 (1999); Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law: Legitimacy,
Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555
(1999); James D. Fry, Legitimacy Push: Towards a Gramscian Approach to International Law,
13 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 307 (2008); LEGITIMACY, JUSTICE AND PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Lukas H. Meyer ed., 2009); Jean d’Aspremont & Eric De Brabandere,
Complementary Faces of Legitimacy in International Law: The Legitimacy of Origin and the
Legitimacy of Exercise, The, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 190 (2010); Christopher A. Thomas, The
Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law, 34 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 729 (2014).
13. As far as I am concerned, the databases that I could use – Web of Science, Hein Online,
JSTOR, or Lexis Nexis – almost always gave me the end of the 1980s as the oldest reference to
international law and legitimacy. There are, of course, references to legitimacy much earlier, but
these referred to legitimacy regarding children, which is a different thing.
14. One possibility relates directly to the end of the Cold War. This point is raised by
Martti Koskenniemi who argues that the end of the Cold War was treated by the majority of
international lawyers as a return to situation ”where the rules of civilised behaviour would come
to govern international life.” Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’ Kosovo,
and the Turn to Ethics in International Law, 65 MODERN L. REV. 159, 160 (2002). Accordingly,
discussions in more overtly moral tones were deemed appropriate and necessary, which in turn
explains the rise of legitimacy discourses. Id. Another possibility relates with the so-called “deformalization” of international law in light of the turn to ”managerialism.” See Martti
Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law–20 Years Later, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 7 (2009).
As many authors have noticed, Koskenniemi being the most prominent one, with the rise of
managerialism, international law is becoming de-formalized. Id. at 14-15. The sources of
international law are becoming less important, and rules are norms are losing their “legal”
quality, making it harder to discuss international law in legal terms. Id. As a result, legitimacytalk allows to evaluate international legal institutions as it goes beyond legality.
15. See Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty:
The Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 425 (1999);
NEIL WALKER, INTIMATIONS OF GLOBAL LAW 1-25 (2014).
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that, until recently, seemed alien to international law. While elements
of the consensual order still exist, they are being supplemented and, in
some instances, replaced by novel forms of authority. 16 Parts of these
transformations include: the shift of authority and sovereignty from the
state to the supranational realm—the European Union (“EU”) being a
paradigmatic example of such case; the emergence of new forms of
law-making into being such as supply-chain contracts; 17 the influence
of multiple actors such as industry associations or semi-governmental
regulatory commissions, among others, in shaping regulation and in
how it is enforced; 18 the novel arrangements, producing normativity
and its enforcement. 19 The upshot of these developments is the further
intrusion of international law in national political and legal processes
and the exertion of “pressure on nations not in compliance with its
norms.” 20
The investment regime is a prime example of those wide-ranging
transformations. It is a “hybrid” system where not only the law but also

16. On the continuity and discontinuity of international law, see Joseph H.H. Weiler, The
Geology of International Law–Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 HEIDELBERG J.
INT'L L. 547 (2004); Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global
Public Goods, 108 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2014); Myres S McDougal, The Impact of International
Law Upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, 4 S.D. L. REV. 25 (1959).
17 . Fabrizio Caffagi, Regulation Through Contracts: Supply-Chain Contracting and
Sustainability Standards, 12 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 219, 219-20 (2016), available at
http://www.responsibleglobalvaluechains.org/images/PDF/Cafaggi_Regulation-throughcontracts.pdf [https://perma.cc/5824-QX33].
18 . See generally Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Regulatory Functions of Transnational
Commercial Contracts: New Architectures, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1557 (2013) (where he
discusses how industry-wide standards are becoming increasingly legally binding obligations).
19 . See generally Jean L Cohen, A Global State of Emergency or the Further
Constitutionalization of International Law: A Pluralist Approach, 15 CONSTELLATIONS 456
(2008); Jan Klabbers, Setting the Scene, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1, 5, 15 (Jan Klabbers, et al., 2009); Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz Renner, Between Law
and Social Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance, 22 RATIO JURIS 260, 261 (2009); A.
CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT
LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 183 (2003).
20. Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework
of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907, 912 (2004). For an overview of these developments, see
generally Machiko Kanetake, The Interfaces between the National and International Rule of
Law: A Framework Paper, in THE RULE OF LAW AT THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
LEVELS: CONTESTATIONS AND DEFERENCE (Machiko Kanetake & André Nollkaemper eds.,
2016); Anne Peters, Supremacy Lost: International Law Meets Domestic Constitutional Law, 3
VIENNA J. INT'L CONST. L. 170 (2009).
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the institutional structure comprises private and public law elements.21
It is a complex web of interlocking and overlapping “rules and ruleenforcing structures,” 22 with the juxtaposition of “hard law”—e.g.,
bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements—with “soft law”—e.g.,
the World Bank’s Guidelines on the Legal Treatment of Foreign
Investment. 23 This Article finds important private and public actors,
states, and international institutions (including the World Bank, the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”),
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(“UNCTAD”), or the International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (“ICSID”)). This article also finds important multinational
corporations and Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGOs”). 24
Finally, the investment regime has had a sizable impact on the
normative evolution of regulation. By now, it is clear that the
investment regime is not a mere resolution system for private disputes,
but that it is an integral part of global governance. The various
institutions of the regime are setting standards for States in the internal
administrative process. Similarly, Investor-State arbitration functions
as a review mechanism to assess the balance a government has struck
in a particular situation between investor protection and other
important public purposes. Additionally, decisions made ex post by
tribunals with regard to such balances may influence what later

21 . See generally Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 74 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. (2004); Gus Van Harten, Private Authority and
Transnational Governance: The Contours of the International System of Investor Protection, 12
REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 600, 606-08 (2005); Asha Kaushal, Revisiting History: How the Past
Matters for the Present Backlash against the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J.
491 (2009). On the public/private distinction in law, see generally, Hilary Charlesworth, The
Public/Private Distinction and the Right to Development in International Law, 12 AUSTRLIAN
Y.B. INT'L L. 190 (1989).
22 . DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION:
INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE 25 (2008).
23. See generally IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT:
"THE WORLD BANK GUIDELINES" 40-43, 63-64, 55, 88-90, 110-12 (1993).
24 . MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 60-69 (2010); GUS VAN HARTEN, REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY 606, 608 (2005); JESWALD W SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 3135 (2d ed. 2015).

2019]

THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY

85

tribunals will do, and may influence ex ante the behavior of States and
investors. 25
In light of the vast impact of the investment regime, the question
of legitimacy has become impossible to ignore. 26 Traditionally, the
consent of the state was the ultimate legitimacy criterion. That criterion
seemed appropriate when treaties, either bilateral or multilateral, were
considerably simpler and their execution depended entirely on states.
However, the significant expansion of international law’s regulatory
reach and the dissolution of the national/international divide have
created a new reality. 27 As a consequence, the “chain of legitimacy
from the national to the international level established at least in part
by the general consent of states . . . is attenuated.” 28 Some then argue
that we are confronted with a widening legitimacy gap, making the
legitimation of international law a pressing concern. 29
Despite the ongoing debate about legitimacy, it is relatively
difficult to pinpoint the reasons for why the notion of legitimacy is so
paramount. Besides some implicit or explicit references to
“effectiveness,” the concept is presented as self-evident in the
literature. Legitimacy appears as if its meaning were generally
understood, and our arguments proceed as if the audience must share
this understanding. Legitimacy seems to signify some crucial and
reasonably discrete feature of political (and legal) life, something that
political (and legal) actors want, that they ought to be and are eager to
seek, and that the rest of us (subjects, citizens, peers) will recognize
and respond to. 30 This creates a situation where there are many

25. Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance:
Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law, 1
(N.Y.U. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper No. 146, 2009).
26. See generally Bodansky, supra note 12; ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 24-30, 50 (2007).
27. Jacob K Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52 HARV. INT'L L. J. 321,
333 (2011).
28 . JÜRGEN FRIEDRICH, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL “SOFT LAW”: THE
FUNCTIONS AND LIMITS OF NONBINDING INSTRUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW 386 (2013).
29. Samantha Besson, The Authority of International Law - Lifting the State Veil, 31
SYDNEY L. REV. 343, 346-47 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
30 . Shane P. Mulligan, The Uses of Legitimacy in International Relations, 34
MILLENNIUM 349, 351 (2006).
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arguments about legitimacy but not over legitimacy, some exceptions
notwithstanding. 31
The appeal of legitimacy can be traced to one of the fundamental
questions within social science and humanities: the problem of order. 32
The problem of order—or what makes a society hold together—has
puzzled scholars of various stripes for centuries. 33 Some have traced
the question all the way back to Thomas Hobbes and his discussion of
the sovereign in Leviathan. 34 The puzzle is that humans can, at the
same time, be extensively social creatures and susceptible to anti-social
forms of action. 35 This duality makes human societies “vulnerable to
possible dissolution” and creates situations where “[o]rder is never so
fully present in concrete social reality as to exclude all deviations,
unpredictabilities, mistaken perceptions, and accidents. Nor is it ever
so utterly absent that completely random behavior, unremitting total
conflict, or social interaction confined to the minimum required by
biological necessity prevails.” 36
Within international law, one of the most prevalent debates
concerns the question of compliance or why states routinely follow
international law. 37 Similar to the conundrum regarding individual
31 . FRANCK, supra note 12, at 16. See generally Bodansky, supra note 12; Daniel
Bodansky, The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law, in LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2008); BRUNNÉE & TOOPE, supra note 12;
Christopher A. Thomas, The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law, 34 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 729 (2014); Odette Lienau, The Challenge of Legitimacy in Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 57 HARV. INT'L L.J. 151 (2016).
32. Sometimes it is also discussed under ‘stability.’ I will use both ‘order’ and ‘stability’
interchangeably. The notion of order adopted here is minimal and formal. Order is understood
to be the ‘absence of conflict and unpredictability,’ see Andrew Abbott, The Idea of Order in
Processual Sociology, 2 CAHIERS PARISIENS 315, 318 (2006). I have equally stated
‘overwhelmingly’ because while legitimacy is generally linked with order, it is not a necessary
one or should be treated as most important relationship, see Mulligan, supra note 30.
33 . JOSEPH HEATH, FOLLOWING THE RULES: PRACTICAL REASONING AND DEONTIC
CONSTRAINT 42 (2008); DENNIS WRONG, PROBLEM OF ORDER 3-4 (1994).
34. This is the argument famously articulated by Talcott Parsons. See TALCOTT PARSONS,
TALCOTT PARSONS ON INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION 82 (1982). Although his
interpretation of Hobbes has been severely criticized, see Robert van Krieken, The paradox of
the ‘two sociologies’: Hobbes, Latour and the Constitution of modern social theory, 38 Journal
of Sociology 255, 258-62 (2002).
35. HEATH, supra note 33, at 42.
36. WRONG, supra note 33, at 3, 11.
37. See Thomas M Franck, Why a Quest for Legitimacy, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535
(1987) (where he discusses debates about legitimacy with how international laws are obeyed);
Harold H Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE J. INT'L L. 2599 (1997)
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behavior, it is a puzzle that states largely abide to international law and
engage in cooperative behavior, when at the same time they engage in
non-cooperative behavior like violating international law or going to
war. 38
So how does order arise? The conventional categories are:
coercion, self-interest or instrumental rationality, and legitimacy. 39
Coercion is straightforward. It indicates the use of compulsion to
induce compliance with an order. Coercion does not have to be equated
solely with the use of force. Rather, it can entail other types of
sanctions like those of an economic or shaming nature. 40 Under selfinterest or instrumental rationality, order arises as “a consequence of
individually maximizing behavior under the correct set of institutional
circumstances.” 41 As the language suggests, this vocabulary is
“economically” inspired and focuses on the interests of agents. 42 In
particular, the notion of order here is reminiscent of the market
economy and its ability to “supply a system of incentives that
seamlessly integrates the interests of instrumentally rational
individuals in such a way as to produce mutually beneficial
outcomes.” 43 Last but not least, order can be explained by
considerations of legitimacy, which tend to encompass all normative
concerns. To be more precise, legitimacy captures the idea of a “sense
of duty, obligation, or ‘oughtness’ towards rules, principles or

(where he discuss the compliance with international law through an iterative process of
incorporation of international law).
38. See, e.g., MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 17-150 (2011). There is the added “in the absence of sovereign,” but that is less relevant
than noticing how the puzzles are identically structured. Plus, the fact that there is a “sovereign”
at the domestic level has not stopped commentators to discuss the problem. Hence, whether there
is a sovereign or not, it is irrelevant.
39. See Thomas, supra note 31, at 4; Bodansky, supra note 12, at 603. There are other
possibilities such as habit, but these are less prominent.
40. Outcasting, for instance, could be considered a sort of coercion. See Oona Hathaway
& Scott J Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.
J. 252, 258 (2011).
41. HEATH, supra note 33, at 43.
42. Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, in
POWER AND GOVERNANCE IN A PARTIALLY GLOBALIZED WORLD 119, 124 (2002).
43. HEATH, supra note 33, at 43. International lawyers with a penchant for economic
analysis have tried to explain order following this language. See generally ANDREW T GUZMAN,
HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008).
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commands” that emerges because they are normatively justified. 44 It is
usually sustained that, even though the three elements interact,
legitimacy is the critical component for the stability of any social
order—the “invisible institution” gluing society together. 45 More
precisely, it is asserted that, while a social order may be maintained
through coercion or self-interest for a period of time, this cannot work
in the long run. That is, coercion and self-interest cannot be considered
to provide a reliable basis for the durability or stability of any set of
institutions if legitimacy is missing. 46
What drives the argument for legitimacy is a simple but powerful
intuition: humans are motivated by normative considerations. In
particular, it is widely believed that we have a sort of moral compass
and that we react if we consider some situations to be against our own
normative commitments. 47 An example of this can be seen in the
protests against TTIP. Many of the criticisms raised have been couched
in normative languages like democracy, fairness, or justice.
The idea behind the workings of legitimacy is multifaceted. For
example, because individuals act according to normative
considerations, they “more easily follow rules and accept roles that can
be justified . . . in normative terms” which implies vice versa that
political and social orders that are not normatively justified “have
difficulties in securing acceptance.” 48 In situations where everyone
shares and accepts the same normative considerations, it then follows
that any particular legal, political, or social order will be more stable
and effective if the institution is based on those normative
44. Martin E Spencer, Weber on Legitimate Norms and Authority, 21 BRITISH J. SOC.,
123, 126 (1970). Obviously the list of “things” to be legitimate is not exhaustive.
45. See generally PIERRE ROSANVALLON, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY: IMPARTIALITY,
REFLEXIVITY, PROXIMITY 9 (Arthur Goldhammer trans. 2011); Brian Barry, John Rawls and
the Search for Stability, 105 ETHICS 874 (1995); Besson, supra note 29.
46. At this point it should be remarked that it does not matter whether we are talking about
a durable order because it is normatively legitimate or whether it is accepted as legitimate by a
certain group of actors. It is possible to have both interpretations in mind to the idea of stability
connected with legitimacy. See MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
125 (Max Rheinstein & Edward Albert Shils trans. 1954); FRANCK, supra note 12, at 15;
Bodansky, supra note 12, at 603; David D Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of
the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT'L L., 552, 558 (1993).
47. See generally John Mikhail, Universal moral grammar: theory, evidence and the
future, 11 TRENDS in Cognitive Science 143, at 143-44 (2007).
48. Xavier Marquez, The Irrelevance of Legitimacy, 5-6 (2012) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author) (Available at SSRN 2027249, 2012).
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considerations. In that case, actors accept the rules of the arrangement
as part of their own normative “worldview” and act accordingly. 49 In
summation, an explanation of order based on legitimacy presupposes a
fundamental connection between legitimacy and the stability and
effectiveness of a regime.
Despite the universal acceptance of legitimacy in international
law, this Article contests the usual explanatory role given to the
concept. 50 This Article argues that, due to its conceptual peculiarities,
legitimacy cannot fulfill the role it is expected to play. Usually, the
literature treats legitimacy as having a twofold dimension: a descriptive
and an evaluative (or normative) part. The descriptive part involves
defining legitimacy as having such and such elements. For instance,
accountability, transparency, fairness, and consistency—which
typically by themselves take a normative stance. This Article’s
contention is instead that legitimacy as a concept is a purely evaluative
and that, as a result, it cannot be circumscribed.51 To make the case,
this Article draws from philosophy of language and ethics. In
particular, this Article focuses on the distinction between thick and thin
concepts. Thin concepts are concepts such as “good” and “bad” which
are purely evaluative in character and, as a result, can be applied to any
context. In contrast, thick concepts, such as “friendly” and “rude," are
simultaneously evaluative and descriptive and are thus limited in their
scope of application. Based on this classification, this Article argues
that legitimacy is a thin concept.
In light of this argument, there are two important consequences
for the treatment of the concept. First, since a priori there are no
grounds on which legitimacy can be delimited, no account of the
concept is better than another. Instead, any two accounts have equal
standing. Secondly, due to the lack of conceptual boundaries, there is
no possibility of empirically tracing a causal relationship between
legitimacy and order. The concept is so expansive that it is explanatory
for everything and, hence, nothing. Meaning, whenever a social
49. Id. at 15.
50. Thus, the contention is a narrow one as it only focuses on the explanatory relationship
between legitimacy and order.
51. My conceptual claim should be separated from a sociological analysis of legitimacy.
To analyze how legitimacy operates within a particular community and its alleged influence is
independent from what one thinks conceptually of legitimacy. Hence to argue that legitimacy is
a purely evaluative concept does not need to affect any sociological analysis.

90

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:1

arrangement is seen as stable it is due to legitimacy; whenever a social
arrangement is changing it is also due to legitimacy; and whenever a
social arrangement is collapsing it is yet again due to legitimacy. 52
This Article advocates a re-evaluation of the concept and its
usage. There are various ways in which this can be undertaken, of
which this Article sketches one. The inspiration for this alternative
approach to legitimacy is taken from international law, yet it draws
from a variety of disciplines. The proposal relies on the justificatory
force of the concept: legitimacy is treated as a rhetorical tool whereby
actors try to pursue certain courses of action. Following this argument,
the importance of legitimacy lies in its employment for the shaping of
perceptions with regard to how institutions and norms ought to be. The
advantage of such alternative understanding of legitimacy is that the
concept does not posit any particular content nor does it assume a
necessary role concerning order. 53 Therefore, the approach is an
analytical, rather than a normative, one.
To illustrate my claims, this Article will analyze the case of the
investment regime. As previously argued, the investment regime
represents a paradigmatic instance of the broader transformations
undergoing the international legal order. The debate concerning the
legitimacy of the investment regime shows the usual ways in which
legitimacy appears in the literature and how it is conceived. Thus, the
investment regime provides a fruitful arena in which to discuss some
of the conceptual criticisms that are put forth here. It follows that,
although the Article’s focus is primarily on the investment regime due
to its central role in international law and global governance, the Article
also aspires to shed light on parallel debates within international law.
Part I maps out the legitimacy debate with respect to the
investment regime. This is accomplished twofold. First, the Article
presents one of the most influential legitimacy accounts within the
literature of international law, proposed by Thomas Franck. 54 Although
52. See BARRY BARNES, THE NATURE OF POWER 25 (1988).
53. It is worth remarking here that the claim just adduced refers to the idea of order as
existent in the world. This is different from the relationship between legitimacy and order as
conceived through legitimacy as a logical, theoretical, or aspirational one. That is to say, if one
conceives legitimacy as comprehending a particular set of liberal values, then the vision of order
that one takes from that understanding of legitimacy is that of a liberal order.
54. For Franck’s writings on legitimacy, see generally Franck, supra note 37; Thomas M.
Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1988); FRANCK, supra
note 12; THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995).
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Franck did not write expansively about the investment regime, the
literature on international investment law has drawn extensively from
his writings. 55 His account provides a focal point from which we can
observe and analyze the frequent assumptions on legitimacy made
implicitly or explicitly in the debate at later points throughout the
Article. 56 The section finishes by mapping out the various elements that
typically fall under the umbrella of legitimacy in the literature. This
55. The only exception found is his chapter on ‘Fairness in International Investment Law’
in FRANCK, supra note 54, ch. 14. He conceives legitimacy as part of fairness as a more general
normative category.
56. On the impact of Franck, see, inter alia, Franck, supra note 9, at 1584-87; Choudhury,
supra note 11, at 497; JÜRGEN KURTZ, THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW:
CONVERGING SYSTEMS 251 (2016); Brower II, supra note 9, at 51-52; Brower & Schill, supra
note 8, at 471; Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights under
Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future?, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. OF INT'L
L. AND POL'Y 47, 79 (2005); Jeffery Atik, Repenser NAFTA Chapter 11: A Catalogue of
Legitimacy Critiques, 3 ASPER REV. INT'L BUS. & TRADE L. 2, 3-4 (2004); Debra P. Steger,
Enhancing the Legitimacy of International Investment Law by Establishing an Appellate
Mechanism, in IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 1, 7, 9 (Armand de
Mestral & Céline Lévesque eds., 2012); Roland Klager, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Look
at the Theoretical Underpinnings of Legitimacy and Fairness, 11 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 435,
436 (2010); Graham Mayeda, Playing Fair: The Meaning of Fair and Equitable Treatment in
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 273, 284 (2007); René Urueña, You’d Better
Listen: Notes on the Mainstreaming of Public Participation in Foreign Investment Arbitration,
16 INT'L L. - REVISTA COLOMBIANA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 294, 305-06 (2010); Rahul
Singh, The World Trade Organization and Legitimacy: Evolving a Framework for Bridging the
Democratic Deficit, 42 J. WORLD TRADE 347, 349-50 (2008); Garcia et al., supra note 9, at 862;
Matthew C Porterfield, An International Common Law of Investor Rights?, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 79, 99-100 (2006); José Gustavo Prieto Muñoz, International Investment Disputes in
South America: Rethinking Legitimacy in the Context of Global Pluralism/Las Controversias
Sobre Las Inversiones Internacionales En Sudamérica: Repensar La Legitimidad En El
Contexto De Pluralismo Global, in INT'L INV. L. IN LATIN AMERICA/DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
DE LAS INVERSIONES EN AMÉRICA LATINA 130, 133 (Attila Tanzi et al. eds., 2016); Graham
Mayeda, International Investment Agreements between Developed and Developing Countries:
Dancing with the Devil: Case Comment on the Vivendi Sempra and Enron Awards, 4 MCGILL
INT'L J. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y, 189, 208 (2008); Mojtaba Dani & Afshin AkhtarKhavari, The Uncertainty of Legal Doctrine in Indirect Expropriation Cases and the Legitimacy
Problems of Investment Arbitration, 22 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 32 (2015); Elizabeth Whitsitt, The
Role of Canadian Courts in the Legitimization of NAFTA Chapter Eleven Tribunal Decisions,
65 UNB L. J. 126, 132 (2014); William W. Burke-White & Andreas Von Staden, Private
Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35
YALE J. INT'L L. 283, 285 (2010); Aristidis Tsatsos, ICSID Jurisprudence: Between
Homogeneity and Heterogeneity a Call for Appeal?, 6 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 1, 6 (2009);
Julia Hueckel, Rebalancing Legitimacy and Sovereignty in International Investment
Agreements, 61 EMORY L. J. 601, 611 (2011); Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority and
International Investment Law, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 465, 499 n.152 (2005); JORUN
BAUMGARTNER, TREATY SHOPPING IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 34, 50-51 (2016).
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Article will take the validity of the criticisms against the investment
regime at face value since, for the purposes of this Article, it is
immaterial whether or not the criticisms are correct. What matters
instead is what is associated to legitimacy. The following section
presents the distinction between thin and thick concepts and argues that
legitimacy is a thin one. Then, this Article will flesh out the
consequences of accepting legitimacy as a thin concept. In particular,
how this affects the literature on international investment law. Finally,
this Article will discuss how to approach legitimacy as part of our legal
and political vocabulary and what this entails with regard to the
investment regime and international law. The Article will conclude by
summing up the main points.

II. THE INVESTMENT REGIME AND ITS EVER CONTESTED
LEGITIMACY
It is well established that the investment regime is one of the most
burgeoning components of the international legal order. Indeed,
according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (“UNCTAD”), seventy-one cases were initiated in
various state-investor arbitration tribunals in 2018. 57 In contrast, it took
a bit more than thirty years to reach a similar amount of cases since the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)
was established in 1966.58 The normative density of investment law has
grown with similar force. What Jeswald W. Salacuse calls the
“treatification of international investment law” 59 has amounted to
2,912 investment treaties, about which 2,354 are currently active, as of
2019. 60 Similarly important, in 2018, the global flows of investment
have reached the number of $1.3 trillion, 61 which has led some scholars

57. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2019:
SPECIAL
ECONOMIC
ZONES
xii
(2019),
available
at
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2019_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZS69-U8QR]
[hereinafter UNCTAD].
58
. See
Concluded
Cases
with
Details,
ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/ConcludedCases.aspx?status=c
[https://perma.cc/H84E-PB9D] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).
59. SALACUSE, supra note 5, at 4.
60 . Investment Policy Hub, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA
[https://perma.cc/S4AK-HGFU] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).
61. UNCTAD, supra note 57 at 2.
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to argue that the investment regime represents one of the “building
blocks” of the global economy. 62
Although the numbers seem to suggest that the investment regime
is a recent treaty-based phenomenon, its history is much older. 63 It is
true that the regime has remained institutionally and normatively
underdeveloped until quite recently, 64 nevertheless, some elements
associated to the regime date back to the 10th century. 65 While a
historical reconstruction of the evolution of the investment regime is
out of the scope of this Article, it is worth emphasizing that the history
of international investment law is one of hybridity, contradictions, and
contestation. 66 At the heart of the regime lies the dispute between the
protection of foreign investors from the capriciousness of the host state
and a state’s sovereignty and freedom of action. 67 Although the
arguments brought forth against and in favor of the investment regime
are diverse, some focus on institutional components, others on
procedural elements, and others on substantive matters, most emerge
from that basic tension.
While the discussion of the investment regime is often couched in
terms of legitimacy, it is typically not complemented by an account of
the concept. With some notable exceptions, the usual approach is to
argue that, the investment regime is suffering a legitimacy crisis
because it lacks X, Y, or Z. Apart from a few brief paragraphs stressing
62 . See, e.g., STEPHAN W SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 3-5 (2009).
63 . KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE,
ENVIRONMENT AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL 19 (2013); SURYA P. SUBEDI,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND PRINCIPLE 1 (2008).
64. See SUBEDI, supra note 63, at 1; Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The
New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L., 365, 367-368
(2003); Jeswald W Salacuse & Nicholas P Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work: An Evaluation of
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L. J., 67, 68 (2005).
65. SALACUSE, supra note 5, at 89.
66. See SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 23, at 26.
67. See, e.g., SORNARAJAH, supra note 25; Jan Wouters et al., International Investment
Law: The Perpetual Search for Consensus, in FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT - THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENT 11
(Olivier De Schutter, et al. eds., 2013); O. Thomas Johnson & Jonathan Gimblett, From
Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of Modern International Investment Law, 2010/2011
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 691 (2010); Alex Mills,
Antinomies of Public and Private at the Foundations of International Investment Law and
Arbitration, J. INT’L ECON. L. 469 (2011). Mills pinpoints that it is possible to identify also a
”progressive” narrative in the literature instead of the conflicting one. However, the majority of
accounts highlight the conflict in the field. Id.
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the overall importance of legitimacy, little else is to be found. This
makes the reconstruction of the concept of legitimacy within the
literature intricate; most assumptions underlying its usage remain
implicit. Nevertheless, due to the profound influence of Franck’s
writing on the matter, we can put forth a sufficiently representative
account of legitimacy, as used in the literature of international
investment law and beyond.
Franck’s interest in understanding legitimacy within the international
legal order is based on the classic questions of obligation and
compliance and of the impact of international law on international
relations. He proposes the following definition of legitimacy:
“Legitimacy is a property of a rule or rulemaking institution which
itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively
because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come
into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted
principles of right process.” 68
Franck identifies and describes four “objective” properties
attached to rules: determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and
adherence. He posits that, “to the extent a rule, or rule process, exhibits
these four properties it will exert a strong pull on states to comply.” 69
Vice versa, he states that when “these properties are not present, the
institution will be easier to ignore and the rule easier to avoid by a state
tempted to pursue its short-term self-interest.” 70
For Franck, determinacy refers to the extent to which the content
of international rules is clearly identifiable. 71 There are two ways in
which an international rule can achieve determinacy and, in
consequence, a greater degree of legitimacy. First, determinacy
requires textual clarity, meaning that the norm, linguistically speaking,
clearly states the conduct that is or is not allowed. Secondly,
determinacy, according to Franck, can be achieved through a process
of clarification. The idea is that a rule, despite being textually unclear

68. Franck, supra note 12, at 24. Those multiple criteria falling under legitimacy and
which apply to national communities can be also adapted for the international community. Id.
at 19.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 49.
71. See id. at 52.
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or vague, can become determinate through a process of interpretation,
undertaken by an authority or on a case-by-case basis. 72
Symbolic validation as a criterion for legitimacy refers to the
cultural and anthropological dimensions of law. Franck asserts that the
ability to “exert a pull to voluntary compliance” is based on the ability
to communicate, not so much through content but in terms of
authenticity: this can be “the voluntary acknowledged authenticity of a
rule or a rule-maker, or, sometimes the authenticity (validity) bestowed
on a symbolic communication’s recipient.” 73 Meaning, the will to
follow an authority might be based on a belief about that authority,
which in turn might be based on some tradition or other factors. Here,
Franck especially points to rituals and pedigree. By ritual Franck refers
to ceremonies, “which provide unenunciated reasons for compliance
with the commands of persons and institutions,” 74 while with pedigree
he emphasizes, “the venerable historic and social origins and continuity
of rule standards, and rule-making or rule-applying institutions.” 75
The third element of Franck’s typology, coherence, categorizes a
norm or institution as legitimate if it can be validated by “the test of
coherent generalization.” 76 Franck argues that if a rule or the
application of a rule is viewed as incoherent, it is less likely to be
followed. The last category, adherence, is related to the notion of
international law as a proper system: there exist primary rules,
secondary rules, and even the ultimate rule of recognition. 77 Adherence
then refers to the idea that a norm exerts a stronger pull to compliance
if it is validated by a “hierarchy of secondary rules . . . establishing
normative standards that define how rules are to be made, interpreted,
and applied.” 78
Although Franck adheres broadly to a procedural conception of
legitimacy, he acknowledges that legitimacy can cover substantive
grounds. To begin, he discusses his procedural conception of
legitimacy in terms of “right process.” 79 Accordingly, legitimacy
encompasses both procedural and substantive elements: it not only
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 61.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 138, 152.
Id. at 183-187.
Id. at 184.
FRANCK, supra note 54, at 7. Chapter 2 expands what constitutes right process.
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matters “how a ruler and a rule where chosen, but also . . . whether the
rules made, and commands given, were considered in the light of all
relevant data, both objective and attitudinal.” 80 Put differently, it is not
enough that a rule was made according to the accepted ways of doing
things, 81 but that the rule can be expected to be adhered to by others
because it was made based on the “right process.” 82 Thus,
considerations like equality or free participation are part of the
underlying account of legitimacy, even if Franck discusses at length the
four indicators presented above. 83
Finally, for Franck, legitimacy should not be “muddled” with
justice, its “symbiotic cousin.” Legitimacy refers to perception,
whereas justice is oriented towards outcomes. Nevertheless, the use of
the word “symbiotic” is intended to convey the idea that “the principles
of justice need infra-structural support from principles of legitimacy.” 84
He sustains that legitimacy can be understood as substantive justice.
Here, Franck points, although not exclusively, to neo-Marxist
philosophers. This group posits that, for a system to validate itself, it
needs to “be defensible in terms of the equality, fairness, justice, and
freedom.” 85
More generally, the arguments regarding legitimacy in the
international law literature can roughly be divided into the following
four categories: 1) legality or rule of law; 2) substantive values; 3)
technical knowledge; and 4) effectiveness. 86 A great majority of
Franck’s criteria are connected to legality. Discussions of substantive
values refer to tenets like justice, autonomy or democracy, among
others. Thus, legitimacy is not only deployed for arguing whether a
certain norm or institution was made “according to the usual,
recognised, prevailing ways of doing things,” 87 but also whether that
rule or institution has substantive standing. 88 With respect to epistemic
80. FRANCK, supra note 12, at 17.
81. RAYMOND GEUSS, HISTORY AND ILLUSION IN POLITICS 35 (2001).
82. FRANCK, supra note 54, at 26.
83. Id. at 29.
84. Thomas M. Franck & Steven W. Hawkins, Justice in the International System, 10
MICH. J. INT'L L., 161 (1989).
85. FRANCK, supra note 12, at 18.
86 . This follows somewhat Andrew Hurrell’s classification. See Andrew Hurrell,
Legitimacy and the Use of Force: Can the Circle Be Squared?, 31 REV. INT'L STUD. 15 (2005).
87. GEUSS, supra note 81, at 35.
88 . Friedrich V. Kratochwil, On Legitimacy, 20 INT'L RELATIONS 303 (2006). For
discussion of the clearest case of understanding legitimacy in terms of substantive values in
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legitimacy, scholars reflect on the quality of certain norms and judicial
decisions in terms of whether a given decision is justifiable in
accordance with a given set of epistemic criteria (formal epistemic
legitimacy), or if a given community believes that it is so justifiable
(social epistemic legitimacy). 89 Lastly, effectiveness captures the idea
that an institution can be considered legitimate if it produces certain
benefits or delivers a solution to particular problems. 90 We shall now
see how the different elements of legitimacy described above are
reflected in the criticisms raised against the investment regime. 91
The first important criticism concerns the normative quality of
international investment agreements and arbitral awards. 92 It is argued
that agreements are often badly written and riddled with ambiguities
and inconsistencies. 93 It is further sustained that the interpretation
given to the texts or norms are enormous and that this can potentially
create an overreach. 94 Clearly, such concerns fall into Franck’s
category of determinacy. Indeed, by not producing textual clarity, those
addressed by the norms do not know beforehand how to conform to the
rule. This leads to unpredictability and destabilization of expectations
of those involved in the investment regime, which in turn facilitates
non-compliance. 95
Another criticism against the investment regime regards its
decentralized nature. The regime is composed of a patchwork of
investment agreements, each of them with their own particularities.96
The means of settling a dispute is arbitration which, unlike a judicial
system, is flexible and temporary. Each time a dispute between two
international law, see Dencho Georgiev, Politics or Rule of Law: Deconstruction and Legitimacy
in International Law, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993).
89. Christopher A. Thomas, Of Facts and Phantoms: Economics, Epistemic Legitimacy,
and WTO Dispute Settlement, 14 J. INT'L ECON. L., 295, 298-99 (2011).
90. A different way of discussing this issue is that of output-legitimacy. The classic
statement appears in FRITZ W SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND
DEMOCRATIC? ch. 1 (1999).
91. Much of the following analysis is owed to Brower II’s application of Franck’s account
on the investment regime. See generally Brower II, supra note 9. Also it should be noted that
the list is not exhaustive.
92. Burke-White & Von Staden, supra note 56, at 300.
93 . Ari Afilalo, Meaning, Ambiguity and Legitimacy: Judicial (Re-) Construction of
NAFTA Chapter 11, 25 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. (2004).
94. Sornarajah, supra note 9, at 43, 45, 51ff.
95. Brower II, supra note 9, at 52; FRANCK, supra note 54, at 30-32.
96 . MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 38 (2015).
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parties emerges, a new arbitral tribunal is set up with potentially
different arbitrators and procedures. The award rendered by the tribunal
is only binding for the parties and the tribunal is subsequently
disbanded. With almost three thousand treaties with investment
protection, this has led to issues of incoherence. Because each arbitral
tribunal is only concerned with the dispute as presented by the parties,
it decides on the particulars of the dispute without taking into
consideration the systemic effects of the decision. As a result, the
various arbitral tribunals, dealing with overlapping normative
concerns, sometimes lead to differing results. 97 As an illustrative
example, we can consider the scope of freedom given to the State for
regulation – the so-called “policy space” under the Fair and Equitable
Treatment (“FET”) clause. 98 On one extreme, there is TECMED v.
Mexico, where the tribunal found that Mexico had violated the FET
clause and thereby followed a very restrictive understanding of policy
space. 99 On the other extreme, we have Parkerings–Compagniet AS v.
Republic of Lithuania, a case where the tribunal found Lithuania to not
have violated the FET clause, sustaining that investors should expect
changes to the regulatory environment as new circumstances arise. 100
97. Franck, supra note 9, at 1545-46; Hueckel, supra note 56, at 611. See generally David
Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking an
Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 383 (2010).
98. On policy space see generally Jörg Mayer, Policy Space: What, for What, and Where?,
27 DEV. POL’Y REV. 373 (2009)
99. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID REV. 158 (2004) [hereinafter TECMED
v. Mexico]. Tecmed, a Spanish company with two Mexican subsidiaries, brought a claim against
Mexico alleging several violations of the Spain-Mexico BIT. These violations concerned
Tecmed’s investment in a waste landfill acquired in 1996. Tecmed alleged to have lost the
landfill in 1998 as a result of the non-renewal, by Mexican authorities, of a license necessary to
operate the landfill. Tecmed argued that as a result of this arbitrary and non-substantiated
decision of Mexico, the investment was completely lost, as it ceased to represent any economic
value as an ongoing business. This, in Tecmed’s view, constituted expropriation. See also
Caroline Henckels, The Role of the Standard Review of the Importance of Deference in InvestorState Arbitration, in DEFERENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: STANDARD OF
REVIEW AND MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 113, 127 (Lukasz Gruszczynski & Wouter Werner
eds., 2014).
100. Parkerings–Compagniet AS v.Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8,
Award, ¶ 335-36 (Sept. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Parkerings v. Lithuania]. Parkerings-Compagniet
AS was a Norwegian corporation with principal business activity consists in the development
and operation of parking facilities. Parkering entered into an agreement with Vilnius
Municipality to construct and operate car parks in the city. The city rejected Parkering’s
proposed project on the Gedimino site because the project was situated in the Old Town, a
culturally protected area designated by the UNESCO. Parkering brought a claim under Norway-
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Accordingly, the State has the right to deal with the new contingencies
and to alter, if necessary, the regulatory framework. 101 Here we observe
two comparable cases in terms of facts and how their diverging legal
interpretations leads to generally incoherent judgments. The fact that
two incompatible interpretations of the same norm can arise follows
from the feature that an interpretation can be done in accordance with
different underlying principles. 102 While the TECMED case was solved
according to the principle of protecting investor’s rights, ParkeringsCompagniet AS was resolved in favor of the principle of state
sovereignty. It is argued that such incoherence upsets the expectations
of actors and thereby affects the legitimacy of the investment regime.103
Next, there are criticisms that highlight certain deficiencies of
arbitral tribunal procedures in comparison to how judicial institutions
normally operate. 104 These can be viewed as belonging to Franck’s
category of symbolic validation, in particular pedigree. One such
criticism centers on the limited options of appealing an award. In a
practice that departs from how national judiciaries operate, a decision
by an arbitral tribunal is final, except in very particular cases. 105 While
initially this feature of international arbitration has been viewed
positively, lately it has received substantive criticism. Particularly,
critics argue that tribunals may render awards of dubious legality,
incorrect in reasoning or application. 106 Especially because arbitral
bodies often deal with issues of public law nature, the lack of space for
a review of an award, even when it has important consequences for the
regulatory space of a state, has come under attack. 107
Lithuania BIT. Parkerings contended that Lithuania violated the fair and equitable treatment
standard because, among other failings, Lithuania failed to maintain a stable and predictable
legal framework and consequently frustrated Parkerings’ legitimate expectations.
101. See Moshe Hirsch, Between Fair and Equitable Treatment and Stabilization Clause:
Stable Legal Environment and Regulatory Change in International Investment Law, 12 J.
WORLD INV. & TRADE 738, 795 (2011).
102. FRANCK, supra note 54, at 621.
103. See Brower II, supra note 9, at 90. .
104. See generally Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness,
and the Rule of Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW
(Stephan W Schill ed. 2010).
105. These being: unfair procedure, lack of independence of the arbitrator, and lack of
jurisdiction.
106. Elsa Sardihna, The Impetus for the Creation of an Appellate Mechanism, 32 ICSID
REV. 503, 504 (2017)
107. Van Harten, supra note 104, at 631.
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Similarly, parts of the literature further criticize how arbitral
tribunals are established, in particular the role of arbitrators. 108 Unlike
judges in courts, arbitrators are not fixed in their position but only serve
for the duration of a dispute. It follows that every time parties go to
arbitration, they need to choose ex novo the members of the tribunal.
This situation has created a “revolving door” where lawyers
alternatively act as lawyers and arbitrators. 109 It has been argued that
this incentivizes lawyers to favor the enterprises: if lawyers write
awards that are favorable to enterprises, those very same enterprises
may rely on them afterwards, either as a lawyer or as an arbitrator.110
As a result, arbitrators may write biased decisions which undermine the
rule of law, and the regime’s legitimacy. 111
Additionally, the lack of transparency throughout the proceedings has
been criticized. 112 The criticism usually takes two forms, related to
confidentiality and participation. Arbitration gives ample flexibility to
the parties in how to organize the proceedings, not only with regard to
the choice of the arbitrators but also with regard to the procedure. One
possible way of configuring the procedures is to make the process and
award confidential. 113 This has become an issue because there are times
when the outcome of the dispute affects third parties outside of the
proceedings. This is especially the case when the judgment deals with
public law considerations. Further, third parties cannot participate in
arbitral proceedings. In particular, within international investment
arbitration, only one type of claimant (the investor) can bring claims

108 . Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s
Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 775, 787 (2008); Hueckel, supra note 56, at 612; Choudhury, supra note 11, at
498.
109 . See generally, Malcom Langford et al., The Revolving Door in International
Investment Arbitration, 20 J. INT’L ECON. L. 301 (2017).
110. Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of
Global Administrative Law, 17 EURO. J. INT'L L. 121, 148 (2006).
111. Van Harten, supra note 104, at 657-58.
112. See, e.g., Julie A. Maupin, Transparency in International Investment Law: The Good,
the Bad, and The Murky, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 153-154, 160-162
(Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., 2013); Nigel Blackaby & Caroline Richard, Amicus
Curiae: A Panacea for Legitimacy in Investment Arbitration, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 253-74 (Michael Waibel et al. eds.,
2010); Choudhury, supra note 108.
113. Abdullah Al Faruque, Mapping the Relationship between Investment Protection and
Human Rights, 11 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 539, 559-60 (2010).
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against a state. 114 The lack of participation of third parties can become
a troubling issue when the dispute affects public law issues that can
have repercussions throughout society. Their arguments and views are
left out, which can lead to a problematic award since not all possibilities
may have been discussed during the arbitration. 115 Taken together,
these practices have been criticized because of their lack of symbolic
validation. More specifically, by departing from widespread practices
at the national level, the attributes of the investment tribunals do not
“signal its significant part in the overall system of social order.” 116
Lastly, the investment regime has been criticized for its lack of
adherence to certain fundamental values of the international
community. 117 Some critics argue that the investment regime suffers
from a democratic deficit, that it breaches the sovereignty of the state,
or that it is ambivalent towards democracy. 118 These arguments are
based on the fact that the investment regime is not a simple composite
of private arbitral bodies dealing with private matters, but that the
investment regime has powers that affect the degree to which states can
pursue certain policy objectives. Meaning, the investment regime is “a
uniquely internationalized arm of the governing apparatus of states, one
that employs arbitration to review and control the exercise of public
authority.” 119 The problem is that, despite the arbitral bodies’ influence
on the host state’s ability in regulating public matters, they are not
accountable. Even though there are similarities between the functions
of investment tribunals and “administrative agencies, certain
democratic restraints on administrative agencies do not apply to
investment arbitral tribunals." 120 There is no review mechanism
114. As Choudhury argues, public intervention has remained more the exception than the
rule. See Choudhury, supra note 108, at 786-87.
115. See generally Nicolás M Perrone, The International Investment Regime and Local
Populations: Are the Weakest Voices Unheard?, 7 TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 383-405
(2016). There have been some reforms so third party actors might participate through amicus
curiae. See generally Eric De Brabandere, Amicus Curiae (Investment Arbitration), Grotius
Centre Working Paper Series, no 2018/080-IEL, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3265970
[https://perma.cc/LYU6-AR75].
116. See Franck, supra note 48, at 34.
117. Brower II, supra note 9, at 71.
118. Blackaby & Richard, supra note 111, at 253; Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 25, at
42; David Schneiderman, Investing in Democracy - Political Process and International
Investment Law, 60 U. TORONTO L. J. 909 (2010).
119. Van Harten, supra note 109, at 124.
120. Choudhury, supra, note 108, at 787.
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controlling or ensuring that the various arbitral bodies act within their
delegated authority. As a result, the considerations of the polity of a
state may be pushed aside by the private interests of an enterprise. A
further way in which the investment regime may violate basic universal
principles is related to the precedence given to economic reasons in lieu
of other values. 121 The investment regime is viewed to prioritize market
rationality over other considerations such as human rights or
environmental concerns. 122 As Choudhry writes, “public interest
regulations embody deeply embedded democratic values held by a
state’s populace. To give less credence to these values, or to simply
ignore them . . . is to establish a hierarchy in which investment values
trump non-investment values, no matter what the effect.” 123
In summation, the investment regime has been criticized on a
variety of fronts. The different criticisms relate to the various elements
ascribed to legitimacy, many of those appearing in Franck’s or related
legitimacy accounts.

III. THIN AND THICK CONCEPTS: THE CASE OF
LEGITIMACY
By now it should be clear that when framing debates in terms of
legitimacy, very different ideas are invoked. The sheer diversity of the
concept makes it difficult to discern the substance of legitimacy or to
find a common core that unites the elements. Moreover, the
multidimensionality of the concept allows us to draw different
conclusions. 124

121 . Paul Michael Blyschak, State Consent, Investor Interests and the Future of
Investment Arbitration: Reanalyzing the Jurisdiction of Investor-State Tribunals in Hard Cases,
9 ASPER REV. INT'L BUS. & TRADE L. 99, 117 (2009).
122 . See, e.g., Moshe Hirsch, Interactions between Investment and Non-Investment
Obligations in International Investment Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 180-82 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008).
123. Choudhury, supra note 108, at 807. A similar line of criticism highlights not only the
economic side of investment arbitration but the hegemonic influence of US norms and standards.
See Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment-NAFTA’s Investment
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 51 (2003).
124. Rogers Brubaker & Frederick Cooper, Beyond “Identity”, 29 THEORY & SOCIETY 8
(2000). The authors raise those issues in relation to the concept of identity, but it is suggested
here that the same issues afflict legitimacy.
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The observation that legitimacy is a highly complex multifaceted
concept has made legitimacy an object of concern among prominent
international lawyers. David D. Caron notes that the concept is loosely
used, and that it is rather “nebulous.” 125 In particular, he posits that the
circumstances under which a particular process is deemed
“illegitimate” are hard to ascertain “because they reflect subjective
conclusions, perhaps based on unarticulated notions about what is fair
and just, or perhaps on a conscious utilitarian assessment of what the
process means for oneself.” 126 The point regarding the imprecise status
of legitimacy as a concept is also raised by James Crawford, who
criticizes the surge of “legitimacy-speak” with its inherent “fuzziness
and indeterminacy.” 127 Lastly, for Martti Koskenniemi, the
indeterminacy of legitimacy “dissimulates a substantive void that
blunts legal and political criticism and lets power redescribe itself as
authority on its own terms.” 128
Nevertheless, large parts of the literature have adopted the concept
enthusiastically. This does not mean that legitimacy is generally used
thoughtlessly. Indeed, scholars acknowledge the ambiguity
surrounding legitimacy, which sometimes leads them to their own
attempt at fixing legitimacy. 129 This typically entails a redefinition of
the concept by determining its scope of reference and a set of criteria
according to which legitimacy is judged. 130 Given such definitions,
authors can then pose the “question of whether some practice or
institutions accords with” the determined set of criteria. 131 For
example, international lawyers evaluate the EU proposal concerning
modifications to TTIP’s ISDS in relation to a set of pre-defined
standards such as the public law theory of international adjudication,
as advocated by Ingo Venzke, whereby any international institution
must exercise public authority through democratic means. 132 Having
125. Caron, supra note 46 at 556.
126. Id. at 557.
127 . James Crawford, The Problems of Legitimacy-Speak, 98 PROC. OF THE ANN.
MEETING (AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L.) 271 (2004).
128. Martti Koskenniemi, Legitimacy, Rights and Ideology: Notes towards a Critique of
the New Moral Internationalism, 7 ASS'NS 349, 367 (2003).
129. See, e.g., Lienau, supra note 31, at 151, 153-54; Thomas, supra note 12.
130. See, e.g., Brower et al., supra note 11, at 418.
131. Mulligan, supra note 30, at 351.
132 . See, e.g., Ingo Venzke, Investor-State Dispute Settlement in TTIP from the
Perspective of a Public Law Theory of International Adjudication, 17 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE
374, 376-78 (2016).
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identified a legitimacy “deficit” according to a particular definition,
one can then find suggestions for how to “improve” the afflicted
institutions or norms so as to make them legitimate. For instance, the
proposal of an appeals tribunal within investment arbitration aims to
remedy possible legitimacy “deficiencies” of the investment regime.133
The implicit idea of fixing legitimacy by settling its content is
misguided. Due to the conceptual characteristics of legitimacy, any
attempt of delimiting the concept will necessarily fall short of capturing
important elements and considerations connected to legitimacy. 134 To
sustain this point, it becomes necessary to explain the analytical
distinction between “thin” and “thick” concepts as developed in
philosophy of ethics and language. 135
When philosophers talk of thin concepts, they raise words like
good, bad, right, wrong, pro, con, or justified. While for exemplifying
thick concepts, they mention words like discreet, cautious, industrious,
lewd, honest, brutal, or courageous. 136 What differentiates the
concepts associated to these words? Although the answer is not always
clear, the basic idea is that thin concepts are purely evaluative, whereas
thick concepts “hold together” evaluation and description. We will first
see the distinction in more detail and then turn our focus back to
legitimacy.
Thick concepts are composed of two elements: an evaluative and
a descriptive one. 137 When someone says that Susan is courageous, one
not only states that Susan has the strength and endurance to confront
something – the descriptive part, but there is also a certain kind of
133. See, e.g., Afilalo, supra note 9, at 82.
134. Furthermore, even if we were able to stabilize legitimacy’s meaning, the outcome
will be a concept so extensive that it cannot bear any explanatory role as anything can fall under
legitimacy, see Mulligan, supra note 30, at 353.
135. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 140-41 (1985).
The distinction between both concepts is generally attributed to Bernard Williams, who coined
the term “thick concept.” Id. Likewise discussions on thick and thin concepts are not only
restricted within ethics but it also shows up in aesthetics and epistemology.
136. PEKKA VÄYRYNEN, THE LEWD, THE RUDE AND THE NASTY: A STUDY OF THICK
CONCEPTS IN ETHICS 1 (2013); Michael Smith, On the Nature and Significance of the
Distinction between Thick and Thin Ethical Concepts, in THICK CONCEPTS 97 (Simon Kirchin
ed., 2013); Matti Eklund, What Are Thick Concepts?, 41 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 1, 1 (2011).
137. Allan Gibbard & Simon Blackburn, Morality and Thick Concepts, 66 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES 267, 273 (1992); VÄYRYNEN,
supra note 136, at 36. The exact relationship between the evaluative and the descriptive has
been a contentious matter in the philosophical literature. However, for the purposes of the article,
it is irrelevant how to demarcate the relationship.
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appraisal – the evaluative part. The evaluative statement does not
necessarily have to be positive. For example, to posit that someone is
lewd not only provides a certain description of the person, but also
incorporates a negative evaluation. Hence, thick concepts allow us to
“get purchase on people, actions, and things that we encounter, and
which become understandable and categorizable to us because of how
we describe them.” 138
International law is full of thick concepts. For instance, coercion.
Article 52 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties establishes
that a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by threat or the
use of force. 139 The notion of coercion has a descriptive part, which is
the use of threats or sanctions to induce an action. At the same time,
coercion conveys a negative evaluation of actions that comprise the use
of force. Closer to international investment law, take the case of FET.
According to a recent UNCTAD report on FET, the concept has been
interpreted as to cover a state’s obligation to act consistently,
transparently, reasonably, without ambiguity, arbitrariness or
discrimination, in an even-handed manner, to ensure due process in
decision-making and respect investors’ legitimate expectations. 140
Thus, the concept has a descriptive part. It helps us in understanding
certain characteristics about the State, as well as an evaluative
component, in this case we have a clear positive connotation.
Also thin concepts are evaluative but, in contrast to thick
concepts, they do not “have much or any descriptive conceptual
content: we get little if any sense of what the object is like beyond the
fact that the user of the concept likes (or dislikes) it, thinks others
should do the same, and so on.” 141 As Thomas M. Scanlon writes, the
most relevant characteristic of a thin concept “lies first and foremost in
the abstractness, hence relative emptiness, of the ethical ideas that they

138 . Simon Kirchin, Introduction: Thick and Thin Concepts, in THICK CONCEPTS 3
(Simon Kirchin ed., 2013).
139. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 52, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (“A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by
the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations”).
140 . U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, FAIR AND EQUITABLE
TREATMENT: UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II
xiii (2011).
141. Kirchin, supra note 138, at 2.
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involve.” 142 Thin concepts can only get their purchase in connection
with other concepts, normally thicker, 143 but what those concepts are is
left unspecified. 144 As Daniel Y Elstein and Thomas Hurka state,
[t]he mark of a thin concept like “right” is that it says nothing about
what other properties an item falling under it has . . . [W]hile the
claim “x is right” says or implies that x has some right-making
properties, it says nothing about what in particular they are. 145

Therefore, the crucial difference between think and thick concepts
lies in the “emptiness” of thin concepts. Specifically, while thick
concepts are constrained by their descriptive content, thin concepts are
not. They “do not carry with them any necessary ontological
commitments and are not confined to a particular practice.” 146 Take the
example between “caring”—a thick concept—and “good”—a thin
concept. For example, when we say that Mary is a caring person, we
are referring to a specific way of acting. We could also say that Mary
is a good person but, while being a caring person connotes a particular
form of behavior, being a good person has no similar constraints. To
say that Mary is good would require further clarification since good
could mean many things, including to be caring. 147
This Article contends that legitimacy is a thin concept, while the
literature overwhelmingly treats it as a thick one. As mentioned above,
a typical mode of proceeding is to argue that legitimacy involves “such
and such” to then evaluate the institution or norm of interest based on
the specified criteria. 148 Thus, by implicitly assuming that legitimacy
involves both evaluation and description, legitimacy is widely
deployed as a thick concept. This understanding of legitimacy appears
explicitly in Franck’s account. He sustains that there is a hypothetical
possibility of determining legitimacy by “identifying” non-coercive
factors that create adherence to international law. 149 At the same time,
he treats those factors as the normative substance of legitimacy, which
142. Thomas M. Scanlon, Thickness and Theory, 100 J. PHIL., 275, 276-77 (2003).
143. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 98 (1995).
144. Smith, supra note 136, at 117.
145. Daniel Y. Elstein & Thomas Hurka, From Thick to Thin: Two Moral Reduction
Plans, 39 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 515, 516 (2009).
146. JOHN G. GUNNELL, POLITICAL THEORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: CUTTING AGAINST
THE GRAIN 139-40 (2011).
147. Kirchin, supra note 138, at 1-2.
148. GUNNELL, supra note 146, at 139.
149. FRANCK, supra note 12, at 22.
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in turn allows for an identification of international legal norms that fall
short of these criteria. 150 The investment regime literature closely
follows this template. Take Brower et al’s analysis. They argue that
arbitral tribunals like NAFTA may enter into a crisis of legitimacy on
the basis of comparing the arbitral tribunals with national judiciaries.
The line of reasoning is to descriptively connect legitimacy with the
characteristics that one might infer by observing national judiciaries
and to then make an evaluation of international arbitration based on
those descriptive elements. 151
It is precisely the way in which legitimacy appears in the literature
that shows the hallmark of a thin concept. To start with, legitimacy is
regularly invoked together with other concepts like transparency,
accountability, sovereignty, independence, fairness, or efficiency to
gain some purchase. Furthermore, among the different accounts, there
is “no sharp distinction between the combinations of conditions that
are, and those that are not, necessary or sufficient for its application.”152
It is not surprising then to find accounts according to which sovereignty
is opposed to legitimacy and others whereby sovereignty is part of
legitimacy. 153 In general, the claim that “x is legitimate” does not tell
us much about the properties or characteristics of x, apart from the fact
that we approve of x or think that x should be approved of. As a result,
there seems to be no conceptual limits on what the properties of x could
be.
To press the point somewhat dramatically, when discussing
international regimes and their power, it is normally believed that the
only legitimate mode of governance is that of democracy. 154 However,
one could equally argue that the only legitimate mode of governance is
epistocracy, for instance. 155 There is nothing conceptually wrong with
such statement. The general upshot is that “[t]here is no single right
150. Id. at 20-23.
151. Brower et al., supra note 11, at 418ff.
152. Heather D. Battaly, Thin Concepts to the Rescue: Thinning the Concepts of Epistemic
Justification and Intellectual Virtue, in VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY : ESSAYS ON EPISTEMIC VIRTUE
AND RESPONSIBILITY 98, 104 (Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski eds., 2001).
153. See Julia Hueckel, supra note 56, at 610-13; Choudhury, supra note 108, at 778
(although therein he does not directly associate the curtailment of the state's decmocratic
expression (which is part of its sovereignty), it follows from the remainder of the discussion in
which he discusses how to make investment more legitmate, that is, by respecting or extending
the democratic processes of the state outwards).
154. See Bodansky, supra note 12, at 599.
155. See generally JASON BRENNAN, AGAINST DEMOCRACY (2016).
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way to fill [legitimacy] in, it will be misguided” to determine which the
real legitimacy is. 156

IV. LEGITIMACY’S LIMITS
If legitimacy is a thin concept, this affects its explanatory power
and by extension the appeal of the concept within the literature. The
first and clearest consequence is that any attempt to pin down the
substance of the concept—to determine what legitimacy really is—will
irremediably fail. Following this argument, the implicit assumption that
legitimacy has a certain “discreet quality that can be observed” is
flawed. 157 There are no rational grounds on which one can sustain that
a particular account is correct or better than others. Evidently, accounts
based on different assumptions can lead to different conclusions when
applied to a particular question. In fact, it is not difficult to find two
accounts of legitimacy, based on different sets of criteria, making
opposite predictions with regard to the legitimacy of a certain
institution or rule. Take, for instance, the long-lasting debate on
whether foreign investors should be treated according to the
international minimum standard, or be treated the same as any national
of the host state. Those pushing for the international minimum standard
relied on the idea of the existence of a minimum of justice and equity
that states had to follow if their laws were not up to those standards.
Because states were part of the international legal order, they were
bound by certain obligations. In particular, the argument was grounded
on state responsibility, which provided protection against injury to both
aliens and alien property. Those advocating investors being treated as
equal as the nationals of the host state, based their arguments on the
premises of sovereign and sovereign equality. Hence, investors could
only enjoy the same rights as those enjoyed by the nationals of the host
state, no more, no less. 158 Accordingly, legitimacy’s thinness makes an
identification of legitimate versus non-legitimate norms, actions or
institutions difficult at best, arbitrary at worst.
A plausible objection against this claim might be that, even if
legitimacy is a thin concept and as such “empty” of substance, this does
not necessarily mean that its scope is boundless. What can be
156. Battaly, supra note 152, at 105.
157. Mulligan, supra note 30, at 353.
158. See Subedi, supra note 63, at 8-11.
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considered legitimate will depend on particular practices and will be
based on recognized, shared criteria. 159 Meaning, “[i]f we know the
other evaluations that someone who asserts this claim has made, we
may be able to guess what [legitimacy-making] properties he has in
mind now; if we know the general evaluative practices of his
culture.” 160
At first glance, this response seems to be compelling. By
observing the social practices of a particular society, we can identify
which criteria are treated as belonging to legitimacy. In Heather D.
Battaly’s (slightly counter-intuitive) terminology this would make
legitimacy a maximally thin concept, whereby “fluent speakers will
have enumerated several seemingly relevant conditions of its
application, but will not have agreed on any combination of them (short
of the whole) that is sufficient or necessary for its application.” 161
Accordingly, legitimacy would be whatever a community, group, or
society decide it to be. In principle, this is an intuitive way to solve the
conundrum. However, as we will see next, it is easier said than done.
The first step in identifying the elements constituting legitimacy
would be to figure out who the fluent speakers are. Let us think of the
investment regime, our main object of study. In light of the wide impact
of the investment regime on various individuals, societies, etc., it is
difficult to find sufficient grounds on which to eliminate certain groups
in determining the substance of legitimacy within a certain society. In
particular, since the investment regime plays an important role in the
States’ ability to regulate different issues, whoever is affected by the
regulatory framework of the State needs to be accounted for. 162 In light
of this, excluding specific groups may have unintended consequences.
For example, suppose we argue that only international lawyers are the
159. Kratochwil, supra note 88, at 305 (although he talks of 'use', it is the same as practice).
Philip Pettit makes a similar claim but he focuses on domination instead of legitimacy. See
PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 57 (1997).
160. Elstein & Hurka, supra note 145, at 516. Within international investment law, this
argument is put by Brower II, drawing explicitly on Franck, see Brower II, supra note 9, at 5357.
161. Battaly, supra note 152, at 105.
162 . The idea of those affected recalls Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics, or (D)
principle, whereby a norm can only be valid when it could meet the approval of all affected by
the norm, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1992). For a similar understanding within
International Relations, see generally Christian Reus-Smit, International Crises of Legitimacy,
44 INT'L. POL. 157 (2007).
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fluent speakers. Under this restriction, any conception of legitimacy
would end up representing the particular preferences and biases of
international lawyers, 163 making it hardly representative. This should
illustrate that the problem of demarcation is dauntingly complex,
especially in an intricate area such as the investment regime. And, if
what constitutes legitimacy is already contested within states, the
situation becomes exponentially more complicated once we move
towards the international domain. 164
The problems do not stop here. Let us assume there is agreement
on the relevant fluent speakers. The next step would be to survey them
so as to find out the shared criteria and practices. There are various
ways of doing so: reviewing the literature, interviewing practitioners,
reading judgments, etc. Either exercise would present us with a list of
elements associated to legitimacy. Now, do we accept them all? Those
only accepted by the majority? What type of majority? These are
difficult questions, which highlight that the decision on what falls in
and out of legitimacy is far from straightforward. More importantly,
even if we were to settle on a number of shared criteria by identifying
“several seemingly relevant conditions of . . . application,” the
emerging list might be incoherent, in tension, or in contradiction,
leaving the ambiguity afflicting legitimacy unsolved.
Finally, the typical criteria linked to legitimacy such as
democracy, legality, accountability, and so forth, are complex and
varied concepts themselves and are thus subject to similar concerns—
if to a lesser extent—as the ones outlined above. The fact that everyone
might share democracy as a value does not automatically entail that
there is substantive agreement on the matter. In fact, what constitutes a
democracy is often subject to significant contestation. 165 Hence, the
argument that the investment regime is illegitimate because it is
163 . In fact, it is contested from neighbouring disciplines the importance of law in
legitimacy. See discussion in Jose E. Alvarez, The Quest for Legitimacy: An Examination of the
Power of Legitimacy among Nations by Thomas M. Franck, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 199,
227 (1991).
164. See TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES (1983).
165. I take this insight from Raymond Geuss. Instead of democracy, he discusses the
example of a society where it is accepted that society is naturally hierarchical with a king at the
head, and that there should be an established church. He argues that the existence of that belief
is perfectly “compatible with disagreement about who is to be king, what the king’s specific
powers are, and how the king is to be related to the established church,” Geuss, supra note 81,
at 6.

2019]

THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY

111

“undemocratic” is sustained on not so uncontroversial premises. Taken
together, even though the idea of reducing legitimacy to a set of shared
practices within a given society might seem reasonable, there are many
conceptual and practical hurdles that substantially diminish its
relevance.
Legitimacy’s thinness equally undermines its explanatory power.
The issue is a methodological one; it concerns the causal relationship
between legitimacy and the stability of institutions and norms.
Surprisingly, this question is rarely discussed explicitly in the
literature. The working assumption is that legitimacy is critical to
institutions and norms. 166 Luckily, Franck tackles the question in more
detail, so his discussion will serve us to point out some of the problems
with regard to legitimacy’s explanatory role.
Franck acknowledges that legitimacy is a broad concept, in
particular that the use of legitimacy refers to “many integral factors,
which are related but different and which must be investigated by
reference to different social data.” 167 He also recognizes that his
proposed criteria for legitimacy are not in themselves sufficient for
providing a full account of why nations obey international rules. “How
rules are made,” Franck writes, “interpreted, and applied is part of a
dynamic, expansive, and complex set of social phenomena.” 168
Additionally, he sustains that legitimacy is not an on/off property of
rules. More precisely, for him, “legitimacy is not merely a matter of
assembling readily available ingredients and mixing them in the right
proportions.” 169 Instead, he argues that there is high variability in levels
of legitimacy and that the degree to which an international rule
produces compliance depends on how much the relevant properties
appear in the particular rule. 170 In sum, legitimacy is a matter of degree
whereby the “degree correlates with an “X” factor or factors which
inhere in the rule or rule-making institution itself.” 171
166. See e.g., Brower II, supra note 9, at 51; Franck, supra note 9, at 1584. Someone like
Bodansky go as far as saying that it might be impossible to determine the influence of legitimacy.
See Bodansky, supra note 12.
167. Franck, supra note 12, at 18.
168. Id. at 49. Thus, he adds that justice is also an important property. What is left unclear
is the particular relationship between justice and legitimacy. Franck only adds that it is a complex
relationship, but never delves further on the matter.
169. Id. at 25.
170. Id. at 41-49.
171. Id. at 48.
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This intuition is plausible and it seems to be shared by wide parts
of the literature. However, as Brian Barry argues, “[t]here is . . . a great
distance between an intuitive feeling that many things affect many
others and a serious attempt to estimate how much part a given factor
plays in the processes.” 172 This concern should not be dismissed as a
mere methodological problem, as Franck’s writings seem to suggest.
Without a way of assessing how much the various legitimacy factors
affect the stability of a norm or institution, the actual relevance of
legitimacy remains elusive. Importantly, despite Franck’s pre-emptive
warnings that legitimacy cannot be achieved by finding the right mix
of ingredients, his account seems to suggest otherwise. In particular,
Franck is committed to a view of legitimacy whereby each component
of legitimacy affects the institution or norm and some components are
more important than others. 173 That is to say, there is an underlying
commitment to measurement and estimation. This is where the
acknowledgment that legitimacy is a thin concept, and therefore does
not have a determinable core, becomes crucial. For any estimation, a
minimum knowledge of the set of explanatory variables is crucial.
Adding or leaving away possible components will typically not only
affect the estimation of the importance of other components comprising
legitimacy, but also the overall assessment of the effect of legitimacy
on stability. The literature is largely silent on the question of how one
could undertake such analysis in practice. 174 Although the lack of an
estimation of the effects of legitimacy does not necessarily imply that
one has to deny the presence of legitimacy or its effects, 175 without any
actual possibility of a valid assessment we are ultimately confronted
with a very convenient theory that can justify any outcome ex-post. 176
In summation, the thinness of the concept undermines the causal
connection between legitimacy and the stability of an institution. The
172. BRIAN BARRY, SOCIOLOGISTS, ECONOMISTS, AND DEMOCRACY 95 (1978).
173. He expressly talks of legitimacy being “measurable by a multi-dimensional formula.”
Franck, supra note 12, at 44.
174. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 9; Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 24.
175. Cf. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Normative Explanations, 6 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 55, 67
(1992). For a similar take see Hurrell, supra note 86, at 17.
176. Although Barry’s remark on the lack of estimation within the social sciences was
written in 1978, the situation has not changed much since then. In a recent article on legitimacy,
Xavier Marquez has noticed how the recent social sciences literature on legitimacy still struggles
in identifying the ‘influence’ of the concept, see Xavier Marquez, The Irrelevance of Legitimacy,
64 POLITICAL STUDIES, 20, 22-23 (2016).
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alleged link is predicated on the assumption that it is possible to
circumscribe legitimacy, since only by determining legitimacy
beforehand, an analysis of the relationship between the stability of an
institution and legitimacy can be envisaged. 177 However, if legitimacy
cannot be constrained or if what falls under legitimacy is immensely
extensive, it cannot fulfill its explanatory role in how to discriminate
stable systems from instable ones. The upshot is that legitimacy ends
up being an ad hoc fallacy wherein any change in any institution or
norm can be attributed to legitimacy or the lack thereof. 178 In more
drastic words, if legitimacy explains everything, then it explains
nothing. 179

V. LEGITIMACY AS BOUNDED ACTION
There are two reasons which help to understand the enduring
power of legitimacy. 180 First, the quest for legitimacy is not only a
quest for normative desirability, but also for order. International
lawyers tend to value the idea of order as it is associated with
predictability. For instance, an element of the rule of law frequently
177. See Franck, supra note 12, at 48.
178. Thus, it is usual to see the formulation that the legitimacy of an institution is based
on such and such except when it is not. Within the literature, we see this type of argument in
Brower II’s account. Brower II argues that the legitimacy of international institutions depends
on predictability, conformity with historical practices, and the inclusion of fundamental values
shared by the members of the governed community. From the text it is not clear how important
each of the various elements is. However, after having presented those elements, he goes on to
argue in any case international institutions might become legitimate by only acting predictably,
without the need of conformity with historical practices or inclusion of fundamental shared
values. Or international institutions might achieve legitimacy only with pedigree, without the
need of incorporating fundamental values, Brower et al., supra note 11, at 57-58. Lienau’s
account operates similarly. She also presents various elements that belong to legitimacy but it is
not clear from her account how important each of the elements is. At the end of her account she
discusses consistency as a criterion for legitimacy. However, she then emphasizes that
consistency should not be taken as part of legitimacy, especially when in connection with a
problematic mechanism. Accordingly, she argues that consistency might be a secondary
standard in the context of her article – sovereign debt restructuring. Thus, Lienau structures the
argument similarly to that of Brower II, whereby consistency is relevant for legitimacy except
when it is not, see Lienau, supra note 31, at 170-171. On the general idea of ‘it applies when it
applies’ see Stephen Turner, Where Explanation Ends: Understanding as the Place the Spade
Turns in the Social Sciences, 44 STUD. IN HIST. & PHIL. SCI. 532, 536 (2013).
179. For the view that perhaps legitimacy is always present, see RODNEY S. BARKER,
LEGITIMATING IDENTITIES: THE SELF-PRESENTATIONS OF RULERS AND SUBJECTS (2001).
180. For the title of this Part, I take it from Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Rethinking Weber:
Towards a Non-Individualist of World Politics, 12 INT'L REV. SOC. 439, 456 (2002).
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highlighted as beneficial is predictability. 181 The positive stance
towards predictability is part of what Judith Shklar dubbed “legalism,”
a particular ethical attitude common among lawyers. Legalism
comprises four interrelated elements: 182 (a) moral conduct and
relationships established in terms of rights and duties as determined by
more general rules; (b) a view of law as something “out there,” separate
from society, something that can be grasped through legal training and
education; (c) the possibility of separating law from morality or
politics; and (d) the fear arbitrariness. It is the last element from which
we can explain part of the attraction to legitimacy. If legitimacy fosters
order—and hence predictability—arbitrariness disappears. 183 If the
investment regime tackles its crisis of legitimacy, or so it is argued, the
regime becomes stable and arbitrariness no longer is a concern. 184
A related, yet more subtle, contributing factor for legitimacy’s
pull can be attributed to its normative connotation. 185 Legitimacy
brings with itself a specific “attitude.” 186 To assert that an institution or
norm is legitimate signals something about its authoritativeness; the
implicit claim states that the institution or norm is worthy of our
approval and of our obedience – or the opposite. 187 As Hanna Pitkin
writes, it is built into the grammar of English that “a legitimate
authority is such that one ought to consent.” 188 Thus, the argument that
particular arbitral tribunals need to be accountable suggests that there
is something defective about the way these arbitral tribunals work and,
as a consequence, that they are not worthy of our compliance. This
181. See, e.g., Brower II, supra note 9, at 52. Within legal theory one famous exponent is
Lon L. Fuller’s account of law in The Morality of Law. The whole account regarding the internal
morality of law and the eight minimal conditions refers to predictability and consistency in one
way or another, see generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (Revised ed. 1977).
182. The four elements are taken from Shklar’s account of legalism in JUDITH N SHKLAR,
LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 1-28 (1986 [1964]). For its widespread
acceptance within international law see Wouter Werner, International Law: Between Legalism
and Securitization, in SECURITY: DIALOGUE ACROSS DISCIPLINES (Philippe Bourbeau ed.
2015).
183. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 54, at 25.
184. See, e.g., Brower II, supra note 9, at 52.
185. See generally, FRANCK, supra note 12.
186. I take the notion of ‘attitude’ from Quentin Skinner, see Quentin Skinner, Language
and Social Change, in MEANING AND CONTEXT : QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS (James
Tully ed., 1988). See also Mulligan, supra note 30, at 368.
187. HANNA F. PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE: ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 280 (1972).
188. Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and Consent—II, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 39, 44 (1966).
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signaling function cannot be detached from legitimacy even when we
discuss it descriptively. In sum, what a legitimacy statement
concerning a particular practice entails is not so much a claim of
knowledge as it is a claim of judgment. 189
By the conjunction of both factors the literature, not only on the
investment regime but on international law more generally, has been
captivated by the concept. However, as George Orwell wrote sixty
years ago, “[t]he worst thing one can do with words is surrender to
them.” If language is to be “an instrument for expressing and not for
concealing or preventing thought” one should “let the meaning choose
the word and not the other way about.” 190 As much as legitimacy might
be alluring, this Article advocates for the need for a fundamental
revision of the concept. This does not necessarily entail eliminating
legitimacy from our legal and political vocabulary altogether. Indeed,
abandoning legitimacy may impoverish our way of thinking, especially
in light of legitimacy’s rich history and centrality in our legal and
political life. 191 This Article instead demands a reappraisal of
legitimacy, one that takes into consideration the thinness of the
concept. In what follows, this Article sketches an alternative
understanding of legitimacy, which avoids some of the pitfalls
encountered in the literature and which may help us in confronting the
transformations of international law and the investment regime. 192
The literature on legitimacy and international law gives us some
initial resources from which the concept can be reconstructed. A first
hint can be found in the writings of Daniel Bodansky on the legitimacy
of international governance. He posits that “[w]e call a regime
‘legitimate’ in order to persuade people (or states) to accept it, and we
criticize it as ‘illegitimate’ in the hope of undermining its authority.” 193
A similar intonation appears in Koskenniemi’s analysis of legitimacy.
He belongs to those scholars that have met legitimacy with a more
critical view. In particular, Koskenniemi criticizes that the language of
legitimacy is used instrumentally: once the language of legitimacy is
189. Mulligan, supra note 30, at 368.
190. George Orwell, Politics and the English Language, in ESSAYS 444-45, (1946).
191. See Mulligan, supra note 30, at 356.
192. As it is implied from the text, there are other ways in which legitimacy can be used.
One would be to “return” to the approach taken by political philosophers and to simply
normatively evaluate institutions and to see whether they are legitimate, but without taken into
consideration the issue of order in explanatory terms.
193. Bodansky, supra note 12, at 601.
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deployed, “[t]he normative framework is in place. The action has been
decided. The only remaining issue is how to reach the target with
minimal cost and delay.” 194 These comments put the focus on how
legitimacy is used rather than on what legitimacy’s content may be.
Hence, the might of legitimacy seems not to come so much from its
explanatory power as from its justificatory force, 195 from how
legitimacy claims are deployed to pursue certain courses of action. Put
differently, when we talk about legitimacy, we should focus on how the
language of legitimacy is used to understand “how the limits of
acceptability are drawn.” 196
The concept of justificatory force should not be regarded as the
possibility of reaching rational agreement through justification, 197 but
rather as highlighting the role of contestation and permanent
disagreement. This Article advocates viewing the language of
legitimacy through the lens of contestation instead of consensus. This
entails the acknowledgment that actors will not only have explicit
disagreements but that they “will have a motivation [to] exploit existing
conflicts or ambiguities in shared beliefs and values.” 198
This understanding of legitimacy is consistent with Bodansky’s
and Koskenniemi’s remarks on the contestedness of legitimacy.
Legitimacy needs to be understood as a “tool in struggles,” connected
to certain values, principles, or morals. 199 Thus, legitimacy does not
represent so much a statement “about the world than [a] . . . weapon of
debate.” 200 By implication, the relevance of legitimacy does not lie in
legitimacy’s “real” content, whose discovery supposedly tells us about
the source of order, but in how it is deployed within particular contexts
as part of a continuous struggle in favor of a particular outcome or new
institutional and normative re-arrangement. As a result, we are
194 . Martti Koskenniemi, Formalism, Fragmentation, Freedom: Kantian Themes In
Today’s International Law, 4 NO FOUNDATIONS 7, 16 (2007).
195. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence, 12 MIDWEST
STUD. PHIL. 433 (1988).
196 . PATRICK THADDEUS JACKSON, CIVILIZING THE ENEMY: GERMAN
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE INVENTION OF THE WEST 24-25 (2006).
197 . The idea of reaching rational agreement is most famously linked with Jürgen
Habermas, but this is a widespread sentiment in both political philosophy and on international
law. See e.g., HABERMAS, supra note 162.
198. GEUSS, supra note 81, at 5-6.
199. Mulligan, supra note 30, at 373.
200 . Quentin Skinner, Rhetoric and Conceptual Change, 3 REDESCRIPTIONS: POL.
THOUGHT, CONCEPTUAL HIST. & FEMINIST THEORY 60, 62 (1999).
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confronted with different and sometimes non-compatible
“legitimacies.” 201 In fact, any dispute cannot seek to simply secure
legitimacy, but seeks to secure one legitimacy over another. The game
of legitimacy is a bit like “tag,” where “it” passes from one player to
another: the game is on so long as “it” remains in operation. 202
Under this reading, legitimacy becomes “a matter of shaping
action indirectly by changing the contours of the social environment
into and out of which action arises.” 203 The different sets of claims and
justifications are thus centered on circumscribing “action to a certain
conceptual region and thereby helping to ensure that actual behaviour
remains more or less within a certain range variation.” 204 Put
differently, the deployment of legitimacy is concerned with “bounding
actions”: it is an activity that contingently determines “the boundaries
of acceptable action, making it possible for certain policies to be
enacted.” 205
To establish, sustain, or modify the boundaries of actions, one
needs to make claims and justifications. Legitimacy can thus be viewed
as part of “vocabularies of motive.” 206 The motives that justify or
criticize a given action link that action to certain situations and thereby
“integrate one man’s action with another’s, and line up conduct with
norms.” 207 Intimately related to such vocabulary of motive are public
justificatory claims, regarded as public encounters which we use to
defend or condemn certain actions. Legitimacy claims, as part of more
general public justificatory claims, are then rhetorical arguments that
rely on cultural or social resources and that are destined to enable or
curtail particular actions. 208 They are directed at “gaining adherence to
an alternative in a situation in which no logically compelling solution
is possible but a choice cannot be avoided.” 209 Such rhetorical
201. GEUSS, supra note 81, at 5.
202. Mulligan, supra note 30, at 369.
203. Jackson, supra note 180, at 452.
204. Id. at 449, 453.
205. JACKSON, supra note 196.
206. C. Wright Mills, Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive, 5 AM. SOC. REV. 905
(1940).
207. Id. at. 905, 908.
208. JUTTA WELDES, CONSTRUCTING NATIONAL INTERESTS: THE UNITED STATES AND
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 117-118 (1999).
209. FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS
OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC
AFFAIRS 210 (1989).
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arguments take as resources the discourses “already in circulation and
link them to particular policies, legitimating those policies and
attributing them as actions to some particular actor.” 210 The purpose is
to “naturalize” some “existing social arrangements” so they come “to
seem obvious and self-evident, as if they were natural phenomena
belonging to a world ‘out there.’” 211
Such an alternative approach to legitimacy provides a more
consistent view of the debate within international law, and the
investment regime in particular. The different appeals concerning the
investment regime belong to a conceptual discourse wherein actors
attempt to pursue one course of action over another. The basic tension
at the core of international investment law, the tension between the
protection of foreign investors and the sovereignty of the states in
determining their own policies, gives rise to different ways legitimacy
claims can be framed—and none of them is superior to the other from
a justificatory point of view. Actors then use the various resources—
events, cases, jurisprudence, etc.—at their reach to push their agenda.
This extends to the different criticisms presented earlier. Those that
think the investment regime is simply suffering from “growing pains”
frame legitimacy in a way that leads us to conclude that criticisms
against the regime can be overcome. While, those that oppose the
investment regime pursue legitimacy arguments that call for more
radical conclusions.
Furthermore, the resources on which legitimacy claims are built
do not in themselves determine any specific course of action, and thus
do not enable predicting in advance which course of action will
prevail. 212 This is not to say that discourses can be stretched
indefinitely. There exist limits, however weak, within which arguments
can be deployed and resources can be strained. Depending on the
setting, there are distinctive “starting-points” from which arguments
can be established. These “these starting-points” are located within a
“substantive set of common understandings that provide for the crucial
connections within the structure of the argument.” 213 A legitimacy
210. JACKSON, supra note 196.
211 . SUSAN MARKS, THE RIDDLE OF ALL CONSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
DEMOCRACY, AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 22 (2003).
212. JACKSON, supra note 196; Barry Barnes, Thomas Kuhn and the Problem of Social
Order in Science, in THOMAS KUHN 128 (Thomas Nickles ed., 2003).
213. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 209, at 219.
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claim should therefore be viewed as a way of creating and reacting to
the world at the same time. 214
To illustrate this within the debate about the legitimacy of the
investment regime, consider the issue of the “policy space” of states,
that is, what actions states can pursue domestically. As previously
mentioned, a controversially discussed topic is the role arbitrators in
investment tribunals play regarding the balance between the rights of
investors, and the ability of states to pursue high-stake policy
objectives. The issue is highly complex and fiercely contested. This
Article’s interest does not lie in the veracity of any of the discussed
arguments, but rather in the narrative that is constructed to delimit or
expand the workings of the investment regime.
Regarding the role of arbitrators in the system, it is useful to
examine the account of Gus van Harten, one of the foremost critics of
the investment regime. First and foremost, his criticism is based on how
arbitrators are appointed. He argues that, since arbitrators have an
interest in being reappointed, the current system of appointment entails
that arbitrators are not independent, leading to a bias in favor of
business interests. 215 According to Van Harten, the upshot is that the
states’ ability to pursue their own policies is severely circumscribed.
To support this argument, Van Harten conducts a thorough analysis of
the investment jurisprudence, wherein he finds that even in situations
where arbitrators could have shown more restraint towards a state’s
freedom of action, they often did not. He concludes that the investment
regime has created “a shift in priorities towards the interests of foreign
owners of assets and away from those of other actors whose direct
representation and participation is limited to other processes and
institutions.” 216 Van Harten concludes that the current status quo of
how arbitrators institutionally operate needs to change. 217 Only then
will the system be “well-suited to determining [sic] the decisionmaking role of legislatures, governments, and courts and, by extension,
the content and structure of sovereign authority.” 218

214. JACKSON, supra note 196.
215. VAN HARTEN, supra note 104, at 643-48.
216. GUS VAN HARTEN, SOVEREIGN CHOICES AND SOVEREIGN CONSTRAINTS: JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 164 (2013).
217. VAN HARTEN, supra note 7; VAN HARTEN, supra note 104; VAN HARTEN, supra note
216, at 164.
218. VAN HARTEN, supra note 216, at 18.
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Let us take a step back and observe how Van Harten constructs
his argument in light of the different resources at his disposal. The
starting point is to be found in the jurisprudence of the various arbitral
tribunals—the legal materials that allow the author to present a
particular narrative. These resources are connected to particular
discourses within the legitimacy debate – in our case independence and
sovereign authority. Within these conceptual discourses, Van Harten
argues how we should interpret the findings. In particular, he draws
from the existing discussion to associate the lack of independence and
sovereign authority to illegitimacy and concomitantly instability of the
system as it stands. His interpretation of what independence or
sovereign authority should be, implicitly or explicitly, contrasts with
what he views the current investment regime to be. What follows then
is that the system needs to be restrained or modified, which in turns
signifies changing the boundaries of what can be done within the
investment regime. 219 Meaning, through the legitimacy discourse, Van
Harten aims at creating a particular view of the world so as to alter the
existing normative boundaries of the investment regime.
This Article’s approach to legitimacy can be easily reconciled
with legitimacy as a thin concept. By treating legitimacy as means of
opening or foreclosing certain courses of actions, the account is not
committed to any particular substantive understanding of legitimacy. It
acknowledges the existence of conflicting usages of legitimacy, or at
least, the possibility of tension between the various approaches.
Secondly, it helps to understand the appeal of legitimacy and provides
context for its usage. Instead of fixing legitimacy, the proposed account
acknowledges that what can be ascribed to the concept is ever-shifting
and open-ended. Thus, it abandons the idea of some “foundational”
basis for stability of a norm or institution, and instead emphasizes the
provisional. 220
What this entails for the investment regime, and for international
law more generally, is that stability is never achieved but should be
viewed as an ongoing process. Any event or action will create certain
intended and unintended consequences to which actors will react and
219. See generally Van Harten, supra note 7. The article addresses five justifications
normally given in defense of the investment regime. He submits then to critical discussion and
implicitly arguing for a different route of the investment regime.
220. See Nathaniel Berman, Intervention in a ‘Divided World’: Axes of Legitimacy, 17
EURO. J. INT'L L. 743 (2006).
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from which new disputes will emerge. As Andrew Abbot has phrased
it, “[i]nstitutions . . . are not fixed beings that can succeed one another,
but lineages of events strung together over time, to which new things
are always bound, and from which old things are always being
detached.” 221 An illustrative example of the ongoing flow of the
international investment regime is the latest round of negotiations
about how to reform the UNCITRAL ISDS regime. As Anthea Roberts
shows, the process of negotiation is quite contentious, and there are
disagreements over how to proceed. The reform in itself is the product
of the legitimacy crisis in which the regime finds itself. Within that
context, disputes abound about how to proceed. Much of the process of
the reform aims to “address” some of the legitimacy concerns such as
transparency and participation. Hence, the “European Union, Germany
and Switzerland have replenished a travel fund administered by
UNCITRAL to enable representatives from developing states to attend
the meetings.” Similarly, UNCITRAL has allowed participants beyond
state representatives to attend the meetings. However, these measures
are only part of the longer game in which states are trying to modify
and alter the system. As the quote of Abbott suggests, some things will
change, such a possible investment appeals tribunal, while others
remain the same. In that larger process, states and other actors will keep
pushing for their strategies and objectives, and for that legitimacy will
be instrumental. 222
Thus, the importance of the outcome of an event—let us say a
particular judgment of an arbitral body—lies in the limits it establishes,
however vague, with regard to what can be achieved in the future. This
idea should resonate with international lawyers. Precedence is a legal
technique which formalizes the past jurisprudence and circumscribes
the available options in the future. Because of the relative openness of
past cases, precedence does not provide a unique way in which a
solution might be reached. The same applies more generally. 223
International lawyers are aware that the existence of law goes hand-in221. Andrew Abbott, PROCESSUAL SOCIOLOGY 202 (2016).
222. Anthea Roberts, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: The Divided West and the Battle by
and for the Rest, EJIL: TALK! (Apr. 30 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isdsreforms-the-divided-west-and-the-battle-by-and-for-the-rest/ [https://perma.cc/2MEP-35Q2].
223. See JACKSON, supra note 196, at 253 (“[t]he possibilities of any given moment are,
in this sense, indebted to the actions undertaken in the previous moment; the actualization of
one of those possibilities shapes the possibilities characteristic of the next moment”).
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hand with the existence of conflict and disagreement. Law serves many
“functions” but surely one of them is the management of struggle.
Many of our more towering figures, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht or Hans
Kelsen, among many others, tried to grapple with the inevitability of
conflict at the international level. 224 Therefore, we should accept the
unavoidability of disagreement and contestation. A reconceptualization
of legitimacy is a step towards this challenge.

VI. CONCLUSION
This Article sought to provide a dynamic understanding of
legitimacy within international law, with a particular focus on the
investment regime. Starting from the observation that, despite the
various disagreements about the state of the investment regime, there
is an almost absolute agreement about the importance of legitimacy for
the investment regime’s stability. The Article, first discussed the
variety of procedural, substantive, and institutional considerations with
regard to legitimacy. One obtains an extensive list of co-existing
elements comprising legitimacy, often in tension and sometimes in
outright contradiction with each other. This Article argued that the
apparent openness of legitimacy is inherent to the concept. More
specifically, drawing on the distinction between thin and thick
concepts, as developed in philosophy of ethics, that legitimacy is a thin
concept, that is, a purely evaluative concept detached from any
particular substance. As a consequence, any attempt to circumscribe
legitimacy will irremediably fail.
More precisely, since there is no such thing as one “correct”
account, any particular proposal determining legitimacy will be unable
to fend off alternative schemes. Instead, if we were to simply aggregate
the conceivable elements comprising legitimacy, we would not only
end up with an incoherent list but also with explanatory problems.
Because legitimacy refers to so much, it becomes impossible to discern
what the actual role of legitimacy is. Legitimacy becomes a catch-all
term with no analytical edge. In light of this, this Article proposes an
alternative understanding of legitimacy, which acknowledges its
thinness and avoids some of the problems built into other accounts.
Legitimacy is understood as justificatory force, used to pursue
certain courses actions. The advantage of this account is threefold: it is
224 . See MÓNICA GARCÍA-SALMONES ROVIRA, THE PROJECT OF POSITIVISM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013).
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not attached to any particular substance, it is dynamic, and it does not
assume the existence of stability. Based on this thought, this Article
argues that international lawyers should embrace the open-ended
nature of legitimacy, which entails the acceptance of conflicting views
and the ever transformational nature of the international legal order.
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